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Using a panel dataset of 320 Indonesian districts we examine the impact of district 
budgets on public health spending, utilization patters in the public and private sector, and 
private health spending in the four years after decentralization. We exploit the panel 
structure of the data and the fact that district budgets are largely driven by central 
government transfers to determine causal patterns. We find that the elasticity of public 
health spending with respect to district budgets is around 0.9 with a higher elasticity for 
development spending than for routine spending. District splits reduce public health 
spending. We find a positive effect of public district health spending on public sector 
utilization, with the strongest effects in the poorest two quintiles. We find no significant 
effects on private sector utilization and out of pocket health expenditures.  
   1
 
1.  Introduction 
 
In recent years, most developing countries have introduced decentralization policies 
which, to varying degrees, delegate the provision of local services (including key health 
services) to sub-national Governments. Given the significance of this trend and of the 
new responsibilities vested in local administrations, it is particularly important to 
understand how sub-national government revenues –and their composition- translate into 
health spending. Moreover, looking at decentralized health finances as opposed to cross 
country data allows to overcome some of the methodological problems that have plagued 
the analysis of health spending effectiveness in the past and to draw general conclusions 
on the transmission channels between public spending and health outcomes.  
Most of the literature on the determinants of health spending analyzes cross-country 
variation. Several authors have noted that total health spending is closely correlated with 
GDP, with an elasticity around one (Ulf-G. Gerdtham and Bengt Jönsson, 2000). The 
share of public spending devoted to health however varies a lot across governments. 
Shelton (C. A. Shelton, 2007) found that governments that have older populations and 
more fractionalization within the population spend more on health. Mauro found that 
corruption is associated with lower government spending on health care (Paolo Mauro, 
1998) .  
There is also a large literature on the effectiveness of public health spending, which again 
is mostly based on cross country variation. Filmer and Pritchett note the lack of 
correlation between public health spending and child mortality and conclude that 
governance, or the way in which resources translate into actual programs, and crowding 
out of private services by public services are the missing chains that explain the low 
correlation  (D. Filmer and L. Pritchett, 1999). Supporting empirical evidence for the first 
claim is provided by Rajkumar and Swaroop (2008), who show that more public health 
spending reduces child mortality in good governance countries. Making a similar   1
argument, McGuire shows that in a cross section of developing countries, access to 
maternal and infant health programs is correlated with decreased under 5 mortality, while 
public health spending is not (J. W. McGuire, 2006). This indicates that it is the quality of 
the implemented programs that matter, and not the spending per se. The effects of public 
health spending may also vary by population segment. Gupta et al. (2003) show, using 
cross-country data, that higher public health spending reduces child mortality among the 
poorest quintile, while no effects can be detected among the rich.  
However, conclusions regarding the determinants and effectiveness of public health 
spending based on cross-country analysis should be interpreted with caution. Omitted 
variable bias, resulting from country specific unobserved historic and institutional factors 
that influence both public spending decisions and health outcomes make it difficult to 
interpret the estimated relationships as causal. Moreover, cross-country analysis cannot 
be used to analyze the determinants of public health spending as the main variable, the 
available budget, is a function of  the same fiscal policy that determines public health 
spending.  Yet, understanding this relationship would be informative for donors 
considering providing budget support to governments, and are concerned whether these 
additional resources will be devoted to public spending in the social sectors. Finally, 
cross-country studies are typically prone to measurement error, due to inconsistencies 
between countries in data quality, data collection tools, and underlying sources of (micro) 
data. 
Analyzing sub-national expenditures in a decentralized context overcomes many of the 
problems associated with cross country analysis. As sub national governments operate 
within the same institutional setting, and often share data collection tools, the analyses are 
less plagued by omitted variable biases. Bhalotra (2007) analyzes the effects of state 
health expenditures in India on child mortality using a 29 year panel of 15 states. She 
finds generally small effects, with a negative significant effect appearing in the third lag 
of public health expenditures for rural areas. 
This paper contributes to the literature on sub national health spending by analyzing 
public health care spending, its determinants and impacts, in 320 Indonesian districts. We   1
look at mechanisms through which local governments’ resources affect district level 
public spending on health, and the impact this has on utilization of health services and 
private health spending. The analysis is based on budget data from 320 Indonesian 
districts from 2001 to 2004 combined with data from household surveys that are 
representative at the district level. In 2001, Indonesia decentralized the health sector to 
the district level, and districts received far reaching authorities to set the size and 
composition of their spending. This period just after decentralization, when budgets were 
still in flux, provides a unique opportunity to analyze the determinants and impacts of 
public health spending, across governments that inherited a similar institutional setting. 
The nature of the data and country setting allows us to analyze sub national health 
expenditures from a different angle compared to previous studies. Because district 
governments are largely dependent on the central government for their budgets, this 
allows us to estimate the Engel curve of public health expenditures, and to test whether 
district governments treat differently various sources of revenues. We also test whether 
the composition of public health expenditure depends on the source of revenues. With a 
large number of districts, but a short panel, we restrict our analysis of outcomes to 
variables which respond quickly to changes in public expenditures. The data on 
utilization of public and private services allow us to test demand response to changes in 
public spending, and the unintentional effect of crowding out private sector services. By 
including an analysis of private health spending we investigate whether increases in 
public spending reduce private spending on health. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of decentralization in 
the health sector in Indonesia. We quickly describe the sources of revenues of districts, 
and the trends in central and district government expenditures over the period of study. 
Section 3 analyzes the determinants of district public health pending, and section 4 the 
impacts of district health spending.  
Section 2 Institutional Setting and Data   1
Using  the methodology developed by Bosserts to determine the extent and depth of a 
country’s decentralization process it appears that Indonesia’s health sector can be 
classified as highly decentralized (Thomas Bossert, 1998)(  6
Table 7).  While districts have the legal responsibility to provide basic health care, they 
have the freedom to set fees for public health services (to be used as a revenue stream for 
local government operations) and there are no rules or guidelines for allocating resources 
and carrying out particular programs. Districts are not required to justify local spending 
to the central government based on outputs or pre-defined objectives.  Instead, district 
governments are accountable to district parliaments. Indonesia’s health care system also 
retains important centralist features. The central government sets employment conditions 
for civil servants, including those paid by district governments. It also finances and runs 
the health insurance program for the poor. As a result, total health spending is split almost 
evenly between the central/provincial level on one hand and the district level on the other 
hand; in 2005, they accounted for 48 percent and 52 percent of public health expenditures 
respectively(World Bank, 2008). 
In spite of their high share of expenditures, districts remain highly dependent on the 
central government for their revenues, 90 percent of which they receive as transfers from 
the center (World Bank, 2008). The largest transfer, 56 percent of total revenues, is the 
general allocation grant (DAU), which is a formula based untied grant. The other main 
transfers are shared tax revenues - 11 percent of total revenues - and shared non-tax 
revenues - 12 percent of total revenues. The former consists largely of property and 
income taxes that are administered by the central government and transferred back to the 
districts.  The shared non-tax revenue is largely a natural-resource revenue that is 
distributed back to the districts (World Bank, 1997). Finally, there is the specific 
allocation grant (DAK) ,a tied resource whose use is determined centrally but which only 
accounts for a modest share of district revenues (3 percent  in 2005). Districts own 
revenues are non-negligible and have been increasing as a share of total district revenues 
(from 10 to 16 percent from 2001 to 2004)(World Bank 2007), but they are unequally 
distributed.  The non-tax revenue, in particular, is a function of the natural resources 
harvested in the district. 
Overall public resources for health increased considerably between 2001 and 2004 (Table 
1.) Total health expenditures increased on average 23 percent on a year to year basis. For   7
comparison, the average inflation rate equalled … over this period and the average 
increase in nominal total public expenditures of all levels of government … percent. 
Indonesia is no anomaly in this respect; other countries that decentralized also increased 
spending in the public sector (F. Javier Arze del Granado, 2005). Both local and central 
governments contributed to rising health expenditures. The elasticities reported in this 
paper thus reflect mostly the impact of increases in public spending, which may differ 
from the ones resulting from downward adjustments (Santiago Lago-Penas, 2008).  




2001 2002 2003 2004 Average annual 
increase
Central Government  3,119 2,907 5,752 5,595 29%
Provincial spending  1,745 2,372 2,821 3,000 20%
District Government  4,387 5,725 7,473 8,108 23%
Total public health spending  9,251 11,004 16,046 16,703 23%
Source: World Bank (2008). 
The empirical analysis in this paper draws on two main data sources. The first is 
Indonesia’s national household survey, Susenas, which is fielded every year and is 
representative at the district level. It contains information on household socio-economic 
characteristics, health services utilization, and private expenditures, including on health. 
The second source, compiled by the Ministry of Finance, contains detailed records of 
local government revenues and expenditures for the post decentralization years; both 
routine and development expenditures can be broken down by sector, including health. 
Routine expenditures consist of salaries and operational costs of providing health services 
at public facilities. Development expenditures are investments, such as upgrading of 
health facilities and training. However, the data do not allow a facility level stratification. 
We combined the two data sources to construct a district level panel.  Since the 
household survey data are collected around February, while the fiscal data reflect 
expenditures during the calendar year, theeffects of changes public spending are observed 
in the Susenas of the subsequent year. We thus constructed a panel that contains the 
spending data of 2001 to 2004, linked with the Susenas data for 2002 to 2005.   8
During the 4 years analyzed, almost a hundred new districts emerged as a result of district 
splits. In such cases, we aggregated the data from the split districts, and assigned those to 
the original district definition. We used variables to track the year and the number of 
“child” districts for each split. We applied the 1998, pre-decentralization, district definition 
frame, which comprised 305 districts. Another problem arose from incomplete household 
survey data. Over the period under investigation, Indonesia faced several local conflicts that 
made it unsafe for surveyors to collect information. Only those districts for which we have 
complete data, 274, are included in the analysis. Since consistent budget data is not available 
for all districts, 67 observations were lost (24% of Susenas panel) when estimation was 
based on both data sources. Finally, two provinces, Aceh and Papua, are excluded from our 
analysis since both have been granted a special autonomy status since 2001 and their 
budgets are not included in the dataset compiled by the Ministry of Finance. The balanced 
panel contains data from 207 districts.Table 2 Descriptive statistics for balanced panel 
(district averages) 
 2001 2002 2003  2004
Per capita district revenues and 
spending  
    
Total revenues      415,987   508,375   557,883    563,934
DAU revenues    316,289   369,773   377,826    371,202
Shared tax revenue     31,218    39,180    44,927     50,786
Shared non tax revenue     20,258    36,496    37,821     40,204
DAK revenue      5,296     2,728    17,559     19,180
Own revenues     27,429    38,724    41,112     41,767
Revenues from other sources     15,497    21,472    38,637     40,795
Total public spending on health     26,057    32,329    39,033     41,959
Development spending on health      5,611     7,735    15,830     17,514
Routine spending on health     20,446    24,594    23,203     24,445
   
  2002 2003 2004 2005
Household utilization and 
spending on health 
    
Nr of outpatient visits per month 
to public health care providers  
0.0727 0.0874 0.0827 0.0944
Nr of outpatient visits per month 
to private health care providers  
0.0793 0.0786 0.0753 0.0724
Per capita out of pocket spending 
on health  
    8,368 6,526 6,664  7,242
      
Utilization and spending on        9
health of households in poorest 
quartile 
Nr of outpatient visits per month 
to public health care providers  
0.0736 0.0716 0.0892 0.0825
Nr of outpatient visits per month 
to private health care providers  
0.0530 0.0464 0.0476 0.0459
Per capita out of pocket spending 
on health per month 
3,339 2,668 2,498 2,386
N 207 207 207  207
Note: District revenue, public spending and OOP health payments in 2001 constant prices Rupiah. 
Source: Revenue from fiscal data from ministry of finance, utilization and out of pocket spending from 
Susenas household survey 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the balanced panel of districts
1, including (i) per 
capita district revenues by source, and health spending for budget years 2001 to 2004, 
and (ii) average district utilization rates and out of pocket (OOP) health spending by 
households in the month prior to the survey, in 2002 to 2005
2. . 
Both district revenues and public health spending increased strongly during the first four 
years of decentralization in Indonesia. Total per capita district revenues increased from 
415,987 Rupiah in 2001 to 563,934 Rupiah in 2005. The bulk of district income comes 
from DAU allocations, but its share decreased from 75 percent in 2001 to 66 percent in 
2004. This is mainly due to increases in shared non tax revenue and DAK spending. 
Public health spending by districts also increased per capita, from 26,057 Rupiah in 2001 
to 41,959 Rupiah in 2004. This change is driven by development health spending, its 
share increasing from 22 to 42 percent, respectively. 
Average utilization of public outpatient care in districts increased from 0.073 out patient 
visits per person per month (vppm) in 2002 to 0.094 vppm in 2005, with a slight dip in 
2004. This trend contrasts private health care utilization, which decreased slightly from 
0.079 vppm in 2002 to 0.072 vppm in 2005. We observe somewhat similar patterns for 
the poorest quarter of the Indonesian population. District average for utilization of public 
health care by the poorest quartile increased from 0.074 vppm in 2002 to 0.083 vppm in 
                                                 
1 District revenue, public spending and OOP health payments are reflected in 2001 constant prices. Rupiah 
– USD exchange rate for 2001 is 10,246 (IMF article IV consultation 2004) 
2 Note that utilization and OOP spending do not reflect national averages, but the average of the district 
averages (i.e. the observations for our balanced panel).   10
2005, most of which occurred after 2003. Utilization of private care decreased from 0.053 
vppm in 2002 to 0.046 vppm in 2005. This gradual move from private to, largely 
subsidised, public utilization is reflected in average per capita OOP health spending by 
the poorest, decreasing from 3,339 Rupiah per capita per month to 2,386 Rupiah in 2005. 
 
3. Determinants of district public health spending 
Public spending on health is closely correlated with overall levels of district government 
revenues (Figure 1). Comparing the pattern of 2004 with that of 2001, the slope is 
steeper and the fit of the curve improves, indicating that districts are converging towards 
a common spending pattern; also, in a simple cross section regressions, the gradient 
increases from 0.91 to 0.99 and the R-squared from 0.58 to 0.70. When we compare the 
changes in district ranking by revenue with changes in ranking by health spending, the 
Spearman Rank correlation between district per capita revenue in 2001 and 2004 is 0.706, 
while for district health spending this is 0.674, indicating that district revenue rank is 
more stable over time than spending rank. We conclude that spending is adjusting to 
revenues, rather than the other way around. 
 
Figure 1 Correlation between district log per capita health spending and log per capita 
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To identify effects of local revenues (Rit) on public health spending patterns (Hit) further, 
model (1) relates district per capita public health spending to district per capita revenues, 
time variant district observable variables, time invariant district unobservable variables, a 
time trend and an error term 
 
it t i it
r




log log log  
(1) 
where  i denotes the district and t the year. Imposing this log-log specification, we 
interpret β as the elasticity of health spending with respect to revenues at the district level. 
We also investigate whether the source of revenue matters for health spending, by 
introducing interaction terms of the share of each main revenue source, srt, with log total 
revenue
3. The set of control variables Xit includes average house ownership in the district 
as proxy for average district welfare, demographic variables (average age, household size 
and percentage female population), fraction of the population that lives in rural area, and 
region fixed effects
4. Time dummy variables pick up aggregate time shocks δt. Since the 
panel is based on the district definition of 1998, we also include a variable that tracks the 
number and timing of district splits. 
Our aim is to identify the causal effect of revenues on health spending. District 
unobservable factors, such as the number of civil servants employed at the time of 
decentralization, could influence both revenues and health spending and if ignored would 
lead to false conclusions regarding inference. By including a district effect, αi, , into the 
equations, we correct for time invariant district specific omitted variables. We employ 
two specifications for αi. The first, random effect model, assumes the district time 
invariant unobservable  i α  to have a normal distribution with mean zero and unknown 
variance. The second, fixed effect model, puts no distributional assumptions with respect 
to  i α . In the latter model the regional effects are absorbed by the district fixed effects. 
Table 3 summarises the estimates of the elasticity of per capita district health 
expenditures on per capita district revenue. Equation (1) is estimated first without the 
                                                 
3 In case of perfect fungibility of district revenue, we should find that γr = 0, for all revenue sources r. 
4 We define 5 regions: (i) Java and Bali, (ii) Sumatra, (iii) Sulawesi, (iv) Kalimantan and (v) Other Islands.   13
interaction terms, and separately for total public health spending, routine spending and 
development spending. A Hausman test rejects the random effects model in favour of the 
fixed effects model, although the elasticities are fairly robust to choice of specification. 
The elasticity of total health spending with respect to revenue is slightly below one, at 
0.88. Development spending is more sensitive to district revenue than routine spending: a 
one percent increase in revenue is associated with about a 1.12 percent increase in 
development health spending whereas routine expenditure increases by only 0.83 percent. 
We conclude that the share of development health expenditures increases as districts have 
access to more resources. 
Table 3 Elasticity of per capita district public health spending w.r.t per capita 
district revenue 
  Random effects  Fixed effects  Hausman test 
Routine spending  0.8431**  0.8284**  0.0022 
 [0.0465]  [0.0657]   
Development health spending  1.2371**  1.1192**  0. 5717 
 [0.0723]  [0.1376]   
Total health spending  0.9468**  0.8789**  0. 0133 
 [0.0344]  [0.0449]   
Statistical significance: + at 10 percent, * at 5 percent, and ** at one percent level. 
Note: balanced panel of 207 districts, 828 observations, 2001-2004. All models control for demographic 
characteristics (average age, household size and percentage female population), percentage rural population, 
average house ownership, district splits, region fixed effects and aggregate time shocks. The Hausman test 
reports p-values for rejecting the hypothesis that the difference in coefficients is not systematic. See the 
supplemental appendix for detailed estimates. Standard errors in brackets. 
 
The fixed effects approach leaves a potential source of bias through endogeneity in 
changes in revenues and spending over time. But the scope for time variant confounding 
effects is small, as all major sources of district revenue are determined exogenously with 
respect to public health spending. The only revenue source that is potentially susceptible 
to endogeneity is own revenues, for example if increased public spending would be used 
to reduce user fees. In addition to this, we estimated equation (1) excluding own revenues. 
We found the results to be not sensitive to excluding own revenues.
5 
                                                 
5 These results are not shown here, but are reported in a supplemental appendix, which is available upon 
request.   14
We examined the relationship between categories of expenditure and sources of revenue 
(Table 4) by including the srt log Rit interaction terms in the specification. Economic 
theory predicts that  the revenue sources do not affect expenditure decisions: money 
being fungible (except for DAK revenues), the revenue source should not pre-determine 
the allocation of resources to various uses. Even for earmarked grants, such as the DAK, 
an increase does not necessarily translate in an equal increase in the associated sector 
spending, as government can adjust the allocation of other budgets (Richard F. Dye and 
Therese J. McGuire, 1992). The interaction term for the DAU share is the base reference. 
Hence, the reported estimates indicate how the spending elasticity would change with a 
result of a fraction change in the share of a specific revenue source (divided by 100 
[Right?]) with respect to DAU funding, keeping all else constant. The baseline 
coefficient (β) can be interpreted as the elasticity of DAU transfers.  
The results suggest that the source of funding does matter for public health spending. The 
overall elasticity of spending of DAU funding is similar to that of total revenue, but a 
percent change in DAU funding has relatively larger effect on routine spending then on 
development spending (as compared to total spending). 
Districts with a relatively larger share of own revenue have a higher elasticity of routine 
spending: a one percent increase in own revenue with respect to DAU increases the 
routine and total health spending elasticity by 0.0015 and 0.0011, respectively. A one 
percent increase in DAK allocation increases the development spending elasticity by 
0.0024 with respect to DAU funding. This could be explained by the earmarking of DAK 
funds. We further find a negative effect of the share of shared tax revenue on 
development spending, while there is no differential effect for shared non tax revenue.    
Districts splits reduce public health spending. A district that split into two districts over 
the period of investigate – and is treated as one observation throughout – has on average 
6 percent lower public per capita health expenditures after the split. It is not possible to 
separately identify the effect of a split on routine and development spending, both 
elasticities are insignificant. Considering the external effects of public health spending 
that go beyond district boundaries, the negative effect of a district split is expected. When   15
districts split, these benefits are not internalized anymore when taking district spending 
decisions. 
Table 4 Elasticity of per capita district public health spending w.r.t per capita district 
revenue (district fixed effects) 
 Routine  Development  Total 
Total district revenue  0.8569**  1.0588**  0.8789** 
  [0.0666] [0.1393] [0.0456] 
Interaction terms with revenue shares       
Own  revenue  0.1513** 0.1182 0.1129** 
  [0.0560] [0.1171] [0.0383] 
Shared tax revenue  0.0346  -0.2564**  -0.0672* 
  [0.0417] [0.0871] [0.0285] 
Shared non tax revenue  -0.0624  -0.0018  -0.0392 
  [0.0443] [0.0927] [0.0303] 
DAK revenue  -0.0849  0.2352*  0.0122 
  [0.0543] [0.1136] [0.0372] 
Revenue from other sources  -0.0360  0.0370  -0.0182 
  [0.0271] [0.0567] [0.0186] 
District splits  -0.0254  -0.0029  -0.0637* 
  [0.0415] [0.0869] [0.0284] 
Statistical significance: + at 10 percent, * at 5 percent, and ** at one percent level. 
Note: balanced panel of 207 districts, 828 observations, 2001-2004. All models control for demographic 
characteristics (average age, household size and percentage female population), percentage rural population, 
average house ownership, district splits, aggregate time shocks and district fixed effects. See the 




3.2 Public health spending and utilization of health services 
 
To uncover causal effects of district health spending on health care utilization we specify 
the utilization rate or log average OOP health care payments, uit, as a log-linear function 
of one-year lagged per capita district health spending and a set of control variables: 
 
 
it t i it it dt dh it it v X H s H c u + + + + + + = − − − δ α λ η π 1 1 1 log log   (2) 
 
The parameter π now reflects the unit change in the utilization rate associated with a one 
percent increase in district per capita public health spending. The control variables Xit are 
the same as in equation (1). We investigate the differential effect of development and   16
routine spending, by means of an interaction effect of the lagged share of development 
spending in overall district health spending, sdt-1, with lagged log district health spending. 
 
Again we need to consider possible endogeneity biases that may result from unobserved 
district specific effects, omitted variables related to local welfare that drive tax revenues 
and health care demand, or even direct reverse causality if increased utilization of public 
care in fact drives up district health budgets. Time invariant district effects that affect 
both health spending and utilization are corrected for by including district fixed effects. 
Dynamic effects, such as a sudden increase in utilization resulting in a sudden increase in 
health expenditures, are to a large extent corrected for by using the previous years’ 
budgets as the explanatory variable for this years’ utilization. Nevertheless, confounding 
time variant unobservables could still frustrate identification through serial correlation in 
vit. We therefore test for endogeneity using a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, instrumenting 
Hit-1 with the shares of different revenues from central government (srt-1): DAU transfers, 
shared non tax revenue and DAK transfers. These seem suitable instruments as there is no 
reason to expect correlation of lagged revenue source shares with current health care 
utilization, while they are likely to affect district spending decisions, as shown in the 
previous section. The instruments provide sufficient support for identification as they are 
jointly significant at 5 percent level and the validity of the exclusion restriction is 
supported by a Sargan test. The Sargan Chi-squared test statistics vary between 0.061 to 
2.406, with a critical value of 4.61 at 10 percent level and 2 degrees of freedom. Finally 
the Durbin-Wu_Hausman test results show no evidence of endogeneity of Hit-1 with 
respect to uit.
6 We therefore choose the fixed effects specification for the remainder of the 
analysis. We also estimated a random effects model, but Hausman tests rejected this in 
favour of the fixed effects specification in all cases except the effect of routine and 
development spending on public utilization.
7  
 
The results of the fixed effect regressions  excluding and including the development 
spending share interaction term (Table 5) suggest that public spending indeed affects 
                                                 
6 The results are not shown here, but are reported in a supplementary appendix, which is available upon 
request. 
7 For detailed estimation results we refer again to the supplemental appendix.   17
overall health care utilization. A one percent increase in district public health spending 
leads to an increase of 0.016 vppm in the overall utilization rate. This result is mainly due 
to the positive effect on public utilization, at 0.011 vppm. Overall, there is no evidence of 
crowding out effects, as the effect on private utilization is but not statistically significant 
but positive. However, in the specification with development spending share interaction 
term routine spending seems to have a positive effect on private care. This could be 
explained by the fact that many physicians in public health centres operate a private 
practice on the side, often referring public care patients to their private practice. Hence, 
increased public utilization through increased routine budgets for public health clinics 
appears to have a positive spill over for the private sector. The development spending 
interaction effect, on the other hand, is negative and statistically significant, probably due 
to the specific nature of development spending. [Does this make sense?] There seems to 
be no differential effect of development spending for public health care utilization. Given 
the increase in public sector utilization that goes with additional public spending, and the 
absence of substitution effects, we would have expected to find some increase of public 
spending on household health expenditures. However, we find no statistically significant 
effect in the data. This would suggest that either increased local public heath budgets 
have been partly used to reduce the direct costs of public care for patients, or that prices 
in the private sector have been cut in response to public sector investments. 
 
Table 5 Effect of (lagged) per capita district public health spending on outpatient health 
care utilization rates and household out-of-pocket health spending (district fixed effects) 
 Public  Private  Total  OOP 
A. Without interaction terms         
District  health  spending  0.0114** 0.0042 0.0156** -0.0173 
  [0.0039] [0.0036] [0.0060] [0.0530] 
B. With interaction terms         
District health spending  0.0108**  0.0068+  0.0176**  -0.0115 
  [0.0040] [0.0036] [0.0061] [0.0546] 
Interaction with share of 
development health spending 
0.0005 -0.0022** -0.0017  -0.0049 
  [0.0008] [0.0007] [0.0012] [0.0110] 
Statistical significance: + at 10 percent, * at 5 percent, and ** at one percent level. 
Note: balanced panel of 207 districts, 828 observations, 2002-2005. All models control for demographic 
characteristics (average age, household size and percentage female population), percentage rural population, 
average house ownership, district splits, aggregate time shocks and district fixed effects. A Hausman test   18
rejects the random effects in favour of the fixed effects specification in all cases except for public 
utilization. See the supplemental appendix for detailed estimates. Standard errors in brackets. 
 
We next investigate the distributional effects of public health spending on utilization, by 




The fixed effect results are given in Table 6. Additional district health spending increases 
health care utilisation mainly for the poorest half of the population. A one percent 
increase in public spending increases the utilization rate by 0.014 vppm for the poorest 
quartile and 0.020 for the second quartile. This mainly occurs at public centers, with no 
differential effect between routine and development spending. We find no effect of public 
spending on OOP health spending by households. The coefficients are negative, but not 
statistically significant. 
 
Table 6 Effect of (lagged) per capita district public health spending on outpatient health 
care utilization rates and household out-of-pocket health spending, by per capita 
expenditure quartile (district fixed effects) 
 Public  Private  Total  OOP 
        
Quartile 1 (poorest)  0.0175**  -0.0032  0.0143+  -0.0738 
 [0.0065]  [0.0039]  [0.0083]  [0.0733] 
Quartile 2 0.0164**  0.0032  0.0197**  0.0224 
 [0.0055]  [0.0042]  [0.0075]  [0.0607] 
Quartile 3 0.0063  0.0005  0.0068  -0.0088 
 [0.0060]  [0.0050]  [0.0087]  [0.0675] 
Quartile 4  (richest)  -0.0055  -0.0048 -0.0104 -0.0723 
 [0.0085]  [0.0090]  [0.0149]  [0.0948] 
Statistical significance: + at 10 percent, * at 5 percent, and ** at one percent level. 
Note: balanced panel of 199 districts, 796 observations, 2002-2005. The number of districts differs from 
Table 5 as we only use districts from the balanced panel for which the survey data contains at least 50 
observations for each quartile. Model specification similar to Table 5. See the supplemental appendix for 
detailed estimates. Standard errors in brackets. 
 
 
DROP THIS TABLE? Effect of (lagged) per capita district public health spending and 
interaction with share of development health spending 
                                                 
8 Since we only use districts from the balanced panel for which survey data contains at least 50 observation 
per quartile, for the quartile analysis we lose 8 districts from the balanced panel, reducing it to 199 districts, 
with 796 observations from 2002-2005..   19
 Public  Private  Total  OOP 
        
Quartile 1 (poorest)         
District health spending  0.0192**  -0.0025  0.0167+  -0.0500 
 [0.0067]  [0.0041]  [0.0085]  [0.0755] 
Interaction with share of 
development health spending 
-0.0015  -0.0006 -0.0020 -0.0199 
 [0.0013]  [0.0008]  [0.0017]  [0.0152] 
Quartile 2         
District health spending  0.0164**  0.0053  0.0217**  0.0122 
 [0.0057]  [0.0043]  [0.0077]  [0.0626] 
Interaction with share of 
development health spending 
0.0000 -0.0017*  -0.0017  0.0085 
 [0.0011]  [0.0009]  [0.0016]  [0.0126] 
Quartile 3         
District health spending  0.0058  0.0036  0.0094  0.0079 
 [0.0062]  [0.0052]  [0.0090]  [0.0695] 
Interaction with share of 
development health spending 
0.0004 -0.0026*  -0.0022  -0.0141 
 [0.0012]  [0.0010]  [0.0018]  [0.0139] 
Quartile 4 (richest)         
District health spending  -0.0069  -0.0003  -0.0073  -0.0748 
 [0.0088]  [0.0093]  [0.0153]  [0.0977] 
Interaction with share of 
development health spending 
0.0012 -0.0038*  -0.0026  0.0021 




This paper analyses spending patterns and utilization of health services during the first 
years of decentralization in Indonesia. We looked in particular at the relationship between 
local revenues and health spending categories (development and routine), and their effect 
on health care utilization. Indonesia’s decentralization is a partial decentralization in the 
sense that a large proportion of the health budget remains under central control. It also 
brought about a massive redistribution of resources across districts. 
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Local government health spending increased sharply with decentralization, reflecting the 
transfer of responsibility and authority from the centre to the districts. Health care 
utilization increased from 2001 to 2004, in particular in the public sector. 
 
Public health spending appears close to elastic with respect to local revenues, with an 
elasticity of around 0.9. Spending is mostly driven by DAU transfers. Thus, DAU 
transfers can be an important tool for influencing local health sector budgeting. 
Inequalities in local revenues sources also appear to play an important role for routine 
health spending, suggesting divergence in spending due to differences in local 
endowments. Transfers from the central government (DAU and DAK) are also the most 
important source of financing for development spending, while we do not find that 
resource rich districts allocate more funds to development health spending. The elasticity 
of development spending with respect to DAU and DAK funding suggests that any 
inequalities in district public health spending could be offset by reallocation of central 
funds. 
 
Local public health spending seems to increase overall health care utilization, in 
particular for the poorest half of the population, without affecting OOP health payments, 
once we control for confounding factors. Increased routine spending seems to have 
positive effects on both public and private health care utilization. 
 
Our results suggest that increased public health spending improves targeting of public 
funds to the poor. At the margin, increased local public health spending leads to net   21
public resource transfers to the poor, as it increases both public health care utilization by 
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Table 7 Decision space of Indonesia's decentralization in health 
      Range of choice   
Function  Indicator  Narrow (centralized)  Moderate  Wide (highly decentralized) 
Finance        
Source of revenue 
Intergovernmental transfers as % of total 
local health spending    DAU2001/8614.3 billion   
Allocation of expenditures 
% of local spending that is explicitly
earmarked by higher authorities   
Many vertical programs remain. Central/local 
health exp =72%   
Fees 
Range of prices local authorities are 
allowed to choose      No rules 
Contracts  Number of models allowed     No rules 
Service organisation  X       
Hospital autonomy 
Choice of range of autonomy for
hospitals  
A number of vertical hospitals remain, Many 
hospital doctors financed out of central budget   
Insurance plans  Choice of how to design insurance plans
Main insurance plans- health
card for the poor, ASKES for
civil servants remain central     
Payment mechanism 
choice of how providers will be paid
(incentives and non-salaried)      Freedom 
Required programs  specificity of normal for local programs    Functions are specified   
Human resources  X       
Salaries  choice of salary range  Centrally decided     
Contract  contracting non-permanent staff       
civil service  Hiring and firing permanent staff    Difficult under civil servant rules   
Access rules  X       
Targeting  defining priority populations    Central guidelines local implementation   
Governance rules  X       
facility boards  Size and composition of boards      Freedom 
district offices  Size and composition of local offices  Old system still in place     
Community participation 
Size, number, composition and role of
community participation    Wide variation   
   23
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